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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ELIZABETH RUTH MUELLER, also REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
known as ELIZABETH MULLER, 
formerly known as ELIZABETH 
RUTH 
M. ALLEN, Appellate Case No. 20040208 - CA 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
District Court Case No. 020910005 
-vs-
DAVID G. ALLEN; SUSAN S., 
ALLEN; RANDY N. McCANDLESS; 
and HALENE McCANDLESS 
Defendants/Appellants. 
Defendants/Appellants (hereinafter "Defendants" or "Aliens") submit the 
following as their reply brief in the above-entitled matter: 
FACTUAL DISPUTES 
Appellants stand by the statement of facts set forth in their opening brief. As to 
various factual claims raised by Appellee in her brief, the Appellants allege the following: 
1. In the "statement of the case" portion of her brief, the Appellee (hereinafter 
also "Plaintiff) asserts that, four months after her divorce from David Allen, the Aliens, 
without the knowledge of consent of Elizabeth Mueller gave the Defendants Randy and 
Halene McCandless possession of the parties' home. As set forth in the Appellant's 
recitation of facts, in their opening brief, the McCandlesses occupied the property in 
question (the "Property") some nine months after Plaintiff and Defendant David Allen 
had separated and almost six months after the entry of the Decree of Divorce. Further, 
the McCandlesses occupied the property after a point in time when Elizabeth Mueller had 
reached the point where she was simply willing to get out of the property and out of the 
obligation thereon, and to save herself from a foreclosure on her credit report. (Tr. Vol. 2 
pg. 110 lines 1-3; 9-11). 
2. It is contended by Plaintiff that she never consented to rent the property to 
anyone, and specifically not to the McCandlesses. However, the record in this case would 
indicate that, at various points in time, Plaintiff expressed a specific interest in renting the 
property because it was so far into foreclosure that rental income needed to be generated. 
(R. 577: 38, 40-41; 578: 302-304). Plaintiff told Rick Curtis she wanted to rent the 
property. (Tr. Vol. 2 pg. 177). 
3. It is asserted in Plaintiffs brief that it was Susan Allen who gave the 
McCandlesses occupancy of the property. On the contrary, it was her son, David Allen, 
an owner of the property who did so. The McCandlesses consistently testified at trial that 
it was their understanding the property was owned by David Allen and his wife Elizabeth 
Mueller, and that they were doing business only with David Allen and Elizabeth Mueller, 
with Susan Allen acting as an agent or intermediary. (Tr. Vol. 2 pg. 178, pg. 228). 
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4. On the day that the McCandlesses moved in to the property, Susan Allen 
telephoned Elizabeth Mueller, requested a return call, and the Plaintiff then telephoned 
Susan Allen. During this conversation, which was recorded, Susan Allen advised 
Elizabeth Mueller, among other things, that Susan Allen would have the McCandlesses 
move out right away if Elizabeth Mueller wanted that to happen (Exhibit 19; R. 577: 49). 
The Plaintiff did not tell either Susan Allen or David Allen that she wanted the 
McCandlesses to move out of the property until this lawsuit was commenced. (R. 578: 
132-133). 
5. In her testimony at trial and to this court (paragraph 20 of the Appellee's 
"Statement of Material Facts") Elizabeth Mueller continues to assert that she "has never 
received any offer from [the Aliens] to pay to her any amount of rental. . . ." In fact, this 
constituted a factual misrepresentation of the Plaintiff to the jury, of which the trial court 
did not permit a correction. Specifically, the Aliens had made several offers of settlement 
in this case, which are contained within the record as Offers of Judgment. Her testimony 
to the effect that she had never "received any offer," which was allowed to stand by the 
trial court, likely left a false impression with the jury that the Defendants had never 
attempted to resolve this case amicably, when in fact they had. 
6. In paragraph 31 of the Plaintiffs Statements of Fact, Plaintiff characterizes 
David Allen's conduct with closing the sale of the property as providing "fictitious 
financing" in an amount of $8,485.00. In fact, David Allen carried back a second lien 
against the property, which was actually recorded as a trust deed and trust deed note for 
$8,485.00, requiring payments by McCandlesses of $62.25. The McCandlesses executed 
a promissory note in that amount. There is absolutely nothing "fictitious" about this 
arrangement. The McCandlesses may not have understood the documents they signed. It 
may be surmised that many lay people who execute real estate closing documents or other 
contracts do not fully understand the terms and conditions of the papers they are signing. 
This does not make the documents "fictitious." It also does not matter that the 
McCandlesses had never made a payment on the promissory note as of the time of trial. 
By the time the sale to the McCandlesses closed, Plaintiff and Defendant David Allen had 
not made a payment on their mortgage for approximately one year. This failure to make 
payments did not render the mortgage "fictitious." It also does not matter that David 
Allen himself appears to have been confused about the terms of the sale of his former 
property. The documents are binding, and speak for themselves. 
It is clear there is a great deal of minutia surrounding this entire property 
transaction over the better part of one year. However, the basic outline of the facts 
remain: Plaintiff and her former husband, David Allen, were both adults. They got 
themselves into ownership of a property in extremely poor condition, were unable to 
repair or improve the property, and it apparently deteriorated while in their possession. 
Eventually, they divorced and were absolutely unable to make mortgage payments on the 
property. Their mortgage fell almost one year in arrears before the sale to the 
- 4 -
McCandlesses saved them from foreclosure. Despite all of her protestations that she did 
not like the situation, Elizabeth Mueller (an adult and property owner) did not find a real 
estate listing agent, did not offer the property for sale by owner, and did not keep 
possession and control of the property when she had it, in order to control and accomplish 
the sale. She elected instead to dump the responsibility onto her former husband and his 
family. She never produced a buyer for the property. She never produced a tenant for the 
property. She never paid one dime out of her own funds either to keep and maintain the 
property or to salvage it from foreclosure once she abandoned it. For this irresponsible 
course of conduct, Plaintiff hopes to retain a judgment against her former husband and 
her former mother-in-law for sums in excess of $50,000.00, together no doubt with 
attorney's fees and surcharges she hopes to be paid for this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I AS A MATTER OF LAW, DAVID ALLEN COULD NOT AND 
DID NOT TRESPASS AGAINST THE PROPERTY 
INTERESTS OF ELIZABETH MUELLER 
The Plaintiff asserts in her brief that David Allen could have and did trespass 
against the property interests of his co-tenant, Elizabeth Mueller. Plaintiff correctly 
asserts that the parties, Elizabeth Mueller and David Allen, were tenants in common of 
the property until it was purchased by the McCandlesses. Thus, as Plaintiff correctly 
asserts, each party had an undivided one-half interest in the property. 
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Plaintiff cites several cases for the proposition that a joint tenant of real property 
can trespass against the joint tenancy of a co-tenant. This is not the holding of any 
cases cited by Plaintiff. There is no case law in Utah saying that one joint tenant can 
trespass against another joint tenant. All the cases cited by Plaintiff stand for something 
else. 
Plaintiffs argument in her brief utterly ignores the impact upon her property rights of 
the Decree of Divorce. Plaintiff seeks to argue this situation in her brief as though she 
and David Allen were merely joint tenants. Such was not the case. They were joint 
tenants in the property who had already participated in one legal proceeding to determine 
their rights, as against each other. In that other legal proceeding (the divorce) a Utah 
court, through the Decree of Divorce, had already made specific orders about disposition 
of the property. These parties no longer had the right to be treated simply as joint tenants 
of certain real property, without restriction. Each party was absolutely bound by the terms 
of the Decree of Divorce. Pursuant to that Decree of Divorce, the parties had lost 
numerous property rights they had previously held as against each other. Most 
compellingly, the majority of joint tenants in real property are not under some legal 
obligation to sell the property. In fact, an interfering order of a court or government 
mandating that they sell their property would be a violation of numerous constitutional 
principles, absent substantial guarantees of due process and absent a compelling 
government interest in taking the property. However, this private property right had 
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changed fundamentally as between these two property owners; they were under a Decree 
of Divorce absolutely mandating that they sell the property. 
Thus, the Plaintiffs protestations here that she stood in the capacity of an 
unrestricted joint tenant in property, and that her co-tenant had violated her rights is 
without basis. She stood in the unique position of a joint tenant who is under the 
obligation of a court order to do one thing and one thing only with her property, and that 
is to sell it. 
Given that the Third District Court in the Decree of Divorce must have 
contemplated that Plaintiff would be required to give up possession of the property in 
order to sell it; and that sole and exclusive occupancy and possession of the property 
would have to go to somebody else in order for it to be sold; and given that Elizabeth 
Mueller was doing nothing whatsoever to advance the cause of selling the property per 
the Decree of Divorce, she cannot now complain of the events which occurred here. She 
cannot now complain that her land was taken from her, or that occupancy of the land was 
given to someone else. In fact, what Defendant David Allen accomplished by his actions 
complained of was exactly what was contemplated by the Decree of Divorce; namely that 
the property was sold, and the parties relieved of the burden of continuing to own that 
property. 
It is extremely important to note that Elizabeth Mueller never claimed at trial and 
does not claim at this appeal that the property should have been sold for more money than 
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its eventual sales price, or that he undersold the property, or that there were other ready 
buyers who were excluded by the occupancy of the McCandlesses. Essentially, her only 
complaint is to the effect that David Allen went about selling the property in a way she 
didn't like, while she presented no alternatives whatsoever. 
Under the totality of these circumstances, the Court's instruction to the jury, to the 
effect that Elizabeth Mueller could recover damages against David Allen for trespass was 
error. This instruction to the jury was objected to timely by Mr. Allen and was error by 
the trial court. 
POINT II AS A MATTER OF LAW, SUSAN ALLEN COULD NOT AND 
DID NOT TRESPASS AGAINST THE INTERESTS OF 
ELIZABETH MUELLER 
Elizabeth Mueller not only claimed trespass in her property interests by her former 
husband, but by her former mother-in-law as well. Her claim in this regard is essentially 
this: that her co-tenant in the property, David Allen, gave his mother and the 
McCandlesses permission to enter upon the property, and that their entry constituted 
trespass against her interests. 
Her claim against Susan Allen is essentially that Susan Allen entered upon the 
property without Elizabeth Mueller's permission, and violated Elizabeth Mueller's 
interests in the property. 
Plaintiff, in her brief, absolutely fails to address the question of whether Susan 
Allen, having had permission from David Allen to enter upon the property, committed 
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some kind of trespass herself by dealing with the McCandlesses at the instruction of her 
son, David Allen. None of the case law cited by the Plaintiff discusses the question of a 
person, such as one in Susan Allen's position, who enters real property with the 
permission of one joint tenant to the property, but then learns after the fact of objections 
to that entry by another joint tenant. There is absolutely nothing to suggest that the 
Defendant, Susan Allen, committed a trespass against the property by entering upon it in 
good faith, with permission from her son. 
It should be noted that this issue of whether Susan Allen can have entered upon the 
premises in an act of trespass at all, having had permission of the Plaintiff s joint tenant, 
is an issue which goes to the question of whether the jury verdict can be supported by the 
evidence and sustained as a matter of law. 
POINT III THE TRIAL COURT LACKED SUBJECT MATTER 
JURISDICTION 
The divorce proceeding between Plaintiff and Defendant David Allen vested the 
divorce court with exclusive jurisdiction to determine Elizabeth Mueller's claims 
regarding the sale of the property which had been ordered by that divorce court. Further, 
the Decree of Divorce resulting in the Third District Court divorce action constituted a res 
judicata order as to Elizabeth Mueller's claims in the trial court here, and collaterally 
estopped the claims of the Plaintiff herein. 
Plaintiff alleges that the court below had jurisdiction, and that the matters here 
were neither res judicata nor collaterally estopped, because all of the issues in this 
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particular case arose months after the entry of the Decree of Divorce. She further makes 
the claim that the claims herein were not only against her husband, David Allen, but also 
against Susan Allen and the McCandlesses, rendering the proceedings in the trial court 
proper. 
It does not matter that the issues herein arose months after the entry of the Decree 
of Divorce. As noted in Appellant's opening brief, the divorce court had continuing 
jurisdiction to enforce the divorce decree and the orders of the divorce court. As 
explained in Appellant's opening brief, the whole factual scenario giving rise to this 
claim has to do with circumstances which were properly part of the divorce decree 
enforcement: that Elizabeth Mueller abandoned the property; that the parties had 
attempted to sell their real estate as required by the divorce court, without success; and 
that the Defendant, David Allen, eventually engaged in the whole pattern of activity 
complained of as a means to sell the property under the Decree of Divorce. 
If Plaintiff did not like the fact that the property had not sold, or the means and 
manner by which David Mueller was attempting to sell it, then her proper and only 
remedy was to go back to the court which had issued the order for sale (the Third Judicial 
District Court in the divorce action) and to complain to that court that things were not 
progressing as ordered. Despite Elizabeth Mueller's protestations at trial herein that she 
was somehow precluded from controlling how the sale of this property was handled, or 
from evicting the McCandlesses when she wanted them evicted, the divorce court always 
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possessed the power to resolve this problem quickly, upon an expedited order to show 
cause before the divorce court's domestic relations commissioner, and then before the 
assigned judge if necessary. Means and methods exist within divorce cases quickly to 
resolve problems of this nature, without the necessity of protracted litigation. However, 
instead of employing this method available to her in the divorce action, Elizabeth Mueller 
chose to pursue this civil claim for damages against her former husband, and against 
those who were parties to his efforts to sell the property according to the terms of the 
divorce decree. Over the objections of the Defendant, the trial court improperly permitted 
this action to go forward. 
This permission of the trial court to the Plaintiff to proceed, in the face of the order 
already existing in the divorce court, and the remedies available there, constituted one of 
the errors for which Appellants are entitled to relief. 
POINT IV APPELLANTS HAVE MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE 
PERTAINING TO THEIR CHALLENGE TO THE 
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
JURY'S VERDICT 
Appellants conceded the obligation to marshal the evidence in support of the jury's 
verdict, and then to refute the same, in order to succeed on their claim that the verdict is 
not supported by the evidence. Aliens have fully and adequately marshaled the evidence 
in this case, to support their claims that the jury verdict cannot be sustained as a matter of 
law. 
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In her brief, the Plaintiff asserts various evidence which she claims were 
unaddressed in the opening brief Aliens contend that, in fact, all of these issues and the 
matters surrounding them have been fully discussed in the Appellant's opening brief, or 
that the evidence is not truly relevant to support the jury verdict. The Aliens contend that 
the evidence cited by Plaintiff is not relevant, in the following particulars: 
1. As to paragraphs 1 and 2, found at page 31, the fact that a person signing a 
lease intended the lessees to have sole and exclusive occupancy of the home is 
immaterial. Obviously, someone who executes a lease and takes possession of property 
as a single family dwelling takes it assuming that they, as the lessee, have sole possession 
with their family. This evidence is further irrelevant because Elizabeth Mueller, herself 
testified that she had abandoned the property at the end of 2001, intending never to 
occupy it and intending it to be sold pursuant to the Decree of Divorce. She had no 
intention or inclination whatsoever to move back into the property and occupy it. She 
also testified, as noted in Appellant's opening brief, that she simply wanted the property 
to be sold, and herself to be protected from the mortgage obligation and from having a 
foreclosure upon her credit report. Since this was her own stated sole objective, the fact 
that the Defendant David Allen allowed third parties to occupy the premises (in the face 
of a direct court order to sell the property) is irrelevant. 
2. It is irrelevant that, as set forth in paragraph 3 page 31 of the brief, Susan 
Allen admitted Elizabeth Mueller had never authorized her to put a tenant in the property. 
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This is irrelevant because it was not Susan Allen who "put a tenant in the property." The 
person who "put a tenant in the property" was David Allen. This was the testimony of 
Susan and David Allen and Halene McCandless in the trial, as noted in the Appellant's 
opening brief. It is irrelevant that Elizabeth Mueller never authorized Susan Allen to "put 
a tenant in the property" because Susan Allen had no authority to do so, with or without 
Elizabeth Mueller's permission, and did not do so. 
3. The evidence set forth at paragraph 4 page 31 is also irrelevant. Whether or 
not Susan Allen told Halene McCandless that Elizabeth Mueller had given permission for 
the McCandlesses to rent the home is immaterial. Susan Allen never rented the property 
to anyone. That was the sole and exclusive conduct of an owner of the property, David 
Allen, acting under a court order requiring him to do what was necessary to sell the 
house. Thus, what Susan Allen did or did not tell the McCandlesses is irrelevant. 
4. The evidence contained at paragraph 5 page 31 is also irrelevant. What 
Susan Allen, as a realtor, would typically recommend to a client about placing a 
prospective buyer in a property prior to closing, is irrelevant. The facts and circumstances 
of this case were driven by a highly undesirable parcel of property, which had not sold for 
a year despite continuous listing on the multiple listing service. Further, the mortgage on 
the property was in arrears for months before the McCandlesses occupied the property, 
and was in foreclosure by the time this action was filed. What Susan Allen would 
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recommend to a "typical" seller has no relevancy to what she would (and did) recommend 
here. 
5. The evidence set forth at paragraph 6 page 31 is irrelevant to this case. 
Again, the March 5, 2002 offer to purchase the home by the McCandlesses was not the 
contract pursuant to which the property was ultimately closed. The fact that the 
McCandlesses did or did not initially offer to purchase the home pursuant to FHA 
financing and that Susan Allen knew or did not know that the property would not qualify 
for FHA financing is irrelevant to a determination of Defendants' culpability under the 
Plaintiffs theories for recovery. 
6. The evidence set forth in paragraph 7 page 31 is, first of all, inaccurate. 
Susan Allen had nothing whatsoever to do with the giving the McCandlesses occupancy 
of the home. She could not give them occupancy since she did not own the property. It 
was David Allen who gave the McCandlesses occupancy of the property by signing a 
lease. Further, it is irrelevant to the consideration of these proceedings that the 
McCandlesses had credit problems or that they needed a "B Loan" for people having 
trouble with credit. The fact remains that this was a highly distressed property. It is 
highly unlikely that anyone having A credit would want to buy this property to live in it. 
The McCandlesses eventually did buy the property, despite their credit problems. The 
fact that anyone may have known about their credit problems prior to the McCandlesses 
occupancy is irrelevant. 
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7. The evidence contained in paragraph 8 page 32 is, likewise, immaterial. 
What the McCandlesses did or did not know about their credit standing as of April 22, 
2002 is irrelevant. The fact that the McCandlesses needed 100% financing for the loan is 
irrelevant. They eventually bought the property. They kept being told by their mortgage 
broker they could qualify. The McCandlesses (together with David Allen and his parents) 
eventually saved Elizabeth Mueller from owing the mortgage, from owing deficiencies 
out of the foreclosure, and from having a foreclosure upon her own credit report. What 
somebody thought in the course of the process of their buying the property is immaterial. 
8. The evidence set forth in paragraph 9 page 32 is irrelevant. First of all, it is 
irrelevant what Susan Allen thought about collecting rental from or evicting the 
McCandlesses from the property. Susan Allen had no interest in the property whatsoever. 
The only property interest was held by her son, David Allen, and by the Plaintiff. Only 
the Plaintiff and David Allen could either collect delinquent rent or evict the 
McCandlesses. Further, it is irrelevant what David Allen understood by the Plaintiffs 
attorney's demand letter. Plaintiff, who was doing nothing to find a buyer for the 
property, doing nothing to support the property, doing nothing to stave off a foreclosure, 
and doing nothing to comply with the Decree of Divorce, could have said whatever she 
wanted in a demand letter through her counsel. What she demanded through her counsel 
was simply irrelevant to an ultimate conclusion of the case. 
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9. The evidence set forth at paragraph 10 page 32 is likewise irrelevant. The 
fact that Halene McCandless, after receiving a notice to pay rent or quit (a fact which is 
marshaled and addressed in Plaintiffs opening brief). That she spoke to either Susan or 
David Allen and read the notice over the phone is immaterial. That discrete fact is 
irrelevant, compared to the fact of the eviction notice, which has been addressed. 
10. The evidence set forth in paragraph 11 page 32 is irrelevant. The fact that 
the McCandlesses were denied a third loan application in August of 2002 is not relevant. 
The fact remains that they actually purchased the property. 
11. The evidence contained in paragraph 12 page 32 is irrelevant. What David 
Allen would have hypothetically done at some hypothetical point is irrelevant to a 
consideration of the evidence in this case. What any witness might hypothetically have 
done under some hypothetical set of circumstances is not relevant, compared to the 
question of what the parties actually did. 
12. The evidence set forth in paragraph 13 page 32 is not relevant. The fact 
that David Allen eventually expressed an opinion substantially similar to the opinion of 
Elizabeth Mueller, that he was tired of dealing with the property and was ready to let fate 
take its course, is not relevant to the consideration of liability in this case. 
13. The evidence set forth in paragraph 14 page 32 is not relevant. First, the 
fact that Susan Allen was aware of the notice to pay rent or quit is not material. The fact 
that Susan Allen knew that the McCandlesses had been denied a loan is immaterial. She 
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was not an owner of the property. She was not an agent for anyone on the property, at the 
relevant time. She was not the tenant occupying the property in violation of a notice to 
pay delinquent rent or quit possession. Hence, her level of awareness or lack of it is 
wholly irrelevant. The fact that the McCandlesses paid partial rent to David Allen in 
September of 2002 is fully addressed in Defendant's opening brief. 
14. With regard to the evidence set forth in paragraph 15 at page 33, the 
Defendants have already fully addressed the method and manner by which the 
McCandlesses came up with the $14,000.00 necessary for them to close the sale of the 
property in their opening brief. The same is true of the evidence set forth at paragraph 16, 
page 33. 
15. The evidence contained in paragraph 17 at page 33 is already addressed in 
the evidence marshaled by the Defendants, to the effect that there is a second deed of trust 
against the property in the sum of $8,485.00 owing by the McCandlesses to David Allen. 
The fact that David Allen may have been confused about the legal effect of these 
documents at various points in time, or the fact that the McCandlesses have never made 
any payment under the promissory note is irrelevant to the Plaintiffs claims of trespass 
against the Aliens or interference with business relationships. 
16. The evidence set forth at paragraph 18 page 33 is irrelevant. The fact that 
some party closing the sale of real estate did not understand and appreciate the full legal 
impact of all the documents signed at a real estate closing has no relevance whatsoever. 
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The relevant facts are what the documents themselves actually say and the legal impact of 
those documents. In fact, under the parole evidence rule, a person's individual 
understanding about legal documents is likely utterly irrelevant. 
17. The evidence set forth at paragraph 19 page 33 is already addressed in the 
Defendant's marshaling of evidence in their opening brief. 
18. The evidence in paragraph 20 page 33, to the effect that the McCandlesses 
have never actually made payments on the promissory note is irrelevant. The Plaintiffs 
damages accrued or failed to accrue, as of the time the property sold. She has made no 
claim at trial for any interest in the promissory note. Conduct occurring after all of the 
events complained of by Plaintiff is utterly irrelevant to a determination of the facts 
surrounding the events she is complaining about. 
19. The evidence set forth at paragraph 21 page 34 has already been addressed 
in the Defendant's marshaling of evidence. 
The Appellant's requirement to marshal evidence has been met in this case. The 
Appellant's opening brief contains more than a voluminous recitation of the evidence. It 
also includes a correlation of the particular items of evidence with the challenged 
findings, and a demonstration of how the challenged findings are clearly erroneous under 
the evidence. 
The Court must consider whether there is a factual basis for the jury to have found 
any tort against the Defendants Allen. There is no such evidence. 
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The jury verdict in this case is for compensatory damages of $8,100.00 against 
David Allen on the claim of tortuous interference with Elizabeth Mueller's business 
relationships. There is no evidence to support the conclusion that Elizabeth Mueller had 
any business relationship whatsoever which was interfered with by David Allen. All 
David Allen did in this case was comply with the Decree of Divorce, which required him 
to sell the real property. He did so. If Elizabeth Mueller believes that David Allen owes 
her money out of the sale of the property, as part of the marital property division, then 
that issue would have been properly addressed in the Decree of Divorce. It does not 
properly constitute a claim for tortuous interference. 
The jury verdict also found compensatory damages of $10,000.00 against David 
Allen and Susan Allen jointly and severally for trespass. (It should be noted, thus, that 
the only basis for a punitive damages claim against Susan Allen was the finding of 
trespass.) The jury verdict also contained a punitive damages award of $5,000.00 against 
David Allen and $30,000.00 against Susan Allen. 
As noted in Defendant's opening brief, and above, there is no evidence in the 
record that Susan Allen trespassed against the interest of Elizabeth Mueller in any 
manner. All of the conduct complained of by Elizabeth Mueller (the renting of the home 
to the McCandlesses, allowing the McCandlesses to remain in the property for months 
thereafter, the failure to support her proposed eviction action against the McCandlesses, 
and the ultimate sale of the home to the McCandlesses) were conduct of the Defendant 
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David Allen and not the conduct of Susan Allen. Since Susan Allen did not own the 
property, she could not have put the McCandlesses in possession. Since she did not own 
the properly, she could not have evicted the McCandlesses. Since she did not own the 
property, she could not have collected the rent therefrom. Since she did not own the 
property, she could not have sold the property to anyone, nor could she have failed to do 
so. 
The only evidence at trial which may have supported a finding of trespass against 
Susan Allen would have been some evidence that Susan Allen had personally entered the 
premises, or had acted to place people in the property, without authority from a title 
owner. All of the evidence at trial and all of the evidence marshaled in this case is to the 
effect that Susan Allen never entered the property without permission from someone of 
authority to give her such (either David Allen, the owner, or the McCandlesses, the 
tenants). Under these circumstances, there is no evidence whatsoever to support a finding 
of trespass against Susan Allen, and no evidence to support the compensatory damage nor 
the punitive damage award against her, based upon trespass. Further, there is no evidence 
at trial to support a finding of trespass against David Allen, because he acted as a joint 
tenant of the property, and because he acted under the direct onus of a court order which 
required him to sell the property (and therefore to give possession of the same to someone 
other than Elizabeth Mueller). 
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Because there can be no basis for a finding of trespass against David Allen or 
Susan Allen, there can be no basis for compensatory or punitive damages awards against 
them. 
Moreover, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-18-1 (1953 as amended), 
punitive damages may be awarded if and only if it can be established by clear and 
convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of the tort feasor are the result of willfull 
and malicious or intentionally fradulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and 
reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of another person. Under the 
facts of this case, it is impossible to find, as a matter of law, by any burden of proof, that 
David Allen, who put other people in possession of his marital home, and then sold the 
property to them, while under a court order requiring him to sell the property, conducted 
himself in a "willfull and malicious or intentionally fraudulent" manner or conducted 
himself toward Elizabeth Mueller in a manner that "manifests a knowing and reckless 
indifference toward" the rights of Elizabeth Mueller. 
Even more so, it is impossible to determine from the facts in this case that, Susan 
Allen conducted herself willfully and maliciously or in any intentionally fraudulent 
manner toward Elizabeth Mueller, or with a disregard for the rights of Elizabeth Mueller. 
This is because Susan Allen could not have done anything with the property, either to rent 
it, sell it, evict tenants from it, collect rent upon it, or otherwise. She simply did not have 
possession or control of the property and never exercised such. All of the conduct in 
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which she engaged was at the direction of a title owner of the property (David Allen) 
acting under the strength of a court order requiring him to dispose of the property. 
In her brief, the Plaintiff, at pages 37 through 41 attempts to explain why the jury 
verdict is supported. She recites a tortured history of a young couple failing economically, 
and attempting to sell a highly undesirable distressed property. She recites many failed 
efforts to sell the property to the ultimate buyers, before the sale finally closed. None of 
this, however, supports her final conclusion that this evidence demonstrates "David Allen 
and Susan Allen had a knowing and reckless indifference to Elizabeth Mueller's rights in 
her home." Elizabeth Mueller complains of the "risk and concern" imposed upon her. 
None of the Defendants imposed upon Ms. Mueller any risk, and Ms. Mueller would 
likely have been extraordinarily concerned about her circumstances, irrespective of the 
conduct of the Defendants. She was obligated for a mortgage she could not afford. That 
was not the result of any tortuous conduct by anyone-it was the result of Elizabeth 
Mueller's and David Allen's foolish decision to buy a home they could not afford. She 
found herself in the unenviable position of being the owner of a bad piece of property. 
Again, this was not the result of anyone's tortuous conduct-she knew the property was in 
distressed condition when she bought it. This was the result of David Allen's and 
Elizabeth Mueller's foolish decision to buy a "handyman special" when they had neither 
the ability nor the financial means to repair the property, nor to develop the property into 
something else more valuable. The Plaintiff found herself owning property for which the 
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mortgage was in arrears, and for which there was eventually a foreclosure proceeding. 
She could find no buyer for the property, despite the fact that she and her former husband 
had had the property listed for sale for a year. 
All of this was no doubt distressing and concerning, but such was not caused by 
any trespass nor interference with business relationships. 
The real crux of the Defendant's claim (and the likely cause of the jury's 
outrageous punitive damage award) is exactly the Plaintiffs argument set forth at page 41 
of her brief: 
Notwithstanding, Susan Allen being a Utah licensed real estate sales person 
for some 14 years was the only "professional" with regard to the 
circumstance and clearly knew better, undertook to engage in activities 
clearly and consistently inappropriate to her licensing and the punitive 
damages award clearly should be a deterrent to further similar engagement 
in her real estate transactions. 
Absolutely none of this theory for recovery of punitive damages here was plead by 
Plaintiff nor instructed to the jury nor argued to the jury as a basis for a punitive damage 
award. Plaintiff has no claims here against the Defendant Susan Allen for professional 
misconduct or professional negligence ("malpractice"). It must be kept constantly in 
mind that the only basis for a punitive damages award was and is a finding of trespass, 
and absolutely nothing in this argument of Plaintiff has anything to do with the concept of 
trespass. 
The verdict, and especially the punitive damage award, cannot be sustained. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the case should be remanded to the trial court to vacate 
the judgment as a matter of law. In the alternative, the case should be remanded to vacate 
the punitive damages awarded. In the alternative, the matter should be remanded for new 
trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 22nd day of February, 2005. 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C. 
MARY C. CORPORON 
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants 
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